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UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES

EASTERN ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

FF1/NELM/5213 343 Ser: 00128 24 February 1960

SECRET

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces

Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
To: Commander in Chief United States European Command

Subj: CINCNELM Annual Historical Report; submission of

Ref: (a) Headquarters United States European Command Directive No. 5-6, ECJS-A dated 9 July 1959

Encl: (1) CINCNELM Annual Historical Report

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1. Pursuant to reference (a) CINCNELM Annual Historical Report for the calendar year 1959 is submitted.

Declassified by SHermanon on 29 Any 8 LIW (NO 1tr of 1/25/79, Subj.; Systematic Review of 20 Year Old Information.

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HQ USEUCOM CONTROL NO: S-60- 2540-//

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PORT LYAUTEY CONTINGENCY WITHDRAWAL PLANNING

Toward the end of 1958, CINCKEIM was alerted to the fact that the political situation in Morocco was such that continued operation of Naval Activities, Fort Lyautay, was in doubt. CINCNEIM was directed by CNO to prepage contingency plans for the withdrawal of all Navy facilities morocco. A plan for the emergency withdrawal from Morocco, covering a period of six months, was prepared and submitted to CNO for approval. The section of the plan covering the relocating of the Naval Communication Facility at Port Lyautey recommends that the responsibilities now assigned to NAVCOMMFAC be divided and relocated to Asmara, Naples, Rota, Londonderry, and an Amphibicus Command Ship in the Mediterranean.

BERLIN SITUATION

In February 1959, while Port Lyautey planning was continuing, military action in response to the Berlin situation seemed inevitable as a result of Soviet pressure and US CINCEUR assigned special communications-electronics responsibilities to the component commands to ensure that these services were not disrupted. 4/ CINCERLM's most important task was providing a VIF or LF transmitter for the delivery of Berlin traffic, and developing a cover plan2/ to conceal the purpose of this transmitter.

This LF transmitter was activated on 3 May 1959 and used for Iceland Barrier Force operations. When the Berlin situation improved, the ECHO (Londonderry) Broadcast was secured on 30 June 1959 and the leased transmitter placed in a standby status on 24-hour notice.

CINCNELM ON-LINE NETWORK

In order to improve the MELM on-line capability, CINCNELM requested in May 1959 that CNO approve the establishment of a CINCNELM on-line net to meet growing local requirements. CNO approved this request and the network went into operation on 1 December 1959.

- 1/ CNO 1tr ser 001007P40 of 28 Nov 1958
- 2/ CNO 1tr ser 001049P40 of 8 Jan 1959
- 3/ CINCNELM OPLAN 101-59 (1tr ser 00979 of 13 Nov 1959)
- 4/ US CINCEUR EC9-696 DTG 051506Z Feb 1959
- 5/ CINCNELM 1916562 May 1959 6/ CINCNELM 2816112 May 1959
- 6/ CINCNELM 2816112 May 1959 7/ CINCNELM 2916012 Jun 1959
- 8/ CINCNELM 1tr ser 0519 of 29 May 1959
- 2/ CNO 1tr ser 010122P94 of 14 Aug 1959
- 10/ CNO 2721312 Nov 1959

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on the part of such supporting activities. As more and more background investigations on Naval personnel involve periods spent oversess in the ELM, the case load backing spirals upward and the pinch is increasingly felt as men and money become acarcer. By April of 1960, CHRCHELM will have lost fully 50% of the unit's officers and 20% of enlisted personnel without reliefs. CNO (DNI) has recently advised that a CHRONELM wroposed reorganization does not appear feasible at present and that funding will have to continue on its present unsound basis. Some improvement will result from the announced DNI provision of one additional civilian agent (bringing the total to five), one civilian counter-intelligence analyst, and one civilian clerk, but even when these newly authorized personnel are eventually aboard, the capability to meet the growing caseload will not exist. Further representations will be made to CNO on this situation.

AIR TARGET MATERIALS PROGRAM (CONFIDENTIAL)

During this period consideration was given to the possibility of dropping the 1:25,000 and 1:100,000 scale messics from the Air Target Materials Program (ATMP), replacing them with 1:50,000 and 1:200,000 scale messics. In many cases, the greater ease in producing and stocking the smaller scale messics did indicate that they would be suitable replacements; however, the loss of detail and accuracy would, in some cases, have reduced operational efficiency and the capability of strike pilots to carry out assigned missions. An all-Navy conference determined that the large scale messics should be retained for targets nominated by CINCPACFLT, CINCLAMFELT, and CINCNELM, while the 1:50,000 and 1:200,000 scale messics should be accepted for all other targets. Net efficiency and strike readiness are expected to be improved as a result of this method of target material production.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY IN BERLIN (SECRET)

A JCS directive to USCINCEUR resulted in major attention being directed toward military intelligence activities conducted in Berlin, with the aim of increasing coordination, eliminating duplication of effort, and reducing personnel. Since the Navy's Berlin operations are siready at a minimum (with only 3 officers, 3 enlisted, and II indigenous civilians involved), no personnel reductions are expected. On the other hand, the measures already instituted will result in an increase in the results which the Navy will obtain from the overall effort.

INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION (CONFIDENTIAL)

Improved coordination of intelligence efforts in many fields is beginning to result from the following events during this reporting period:

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and naval gunfire support, ship to shore movement in landing craft and helicopters, beach operations, communications and tactical operations ashore.

The Lending Force, which included both US Marines and Royal Marines under the control of a US Marine officer, landed prior to dawn on 23 June. It was accomplished without casualty or serious incident. Cooperation and coordination was the highest order. With only minor exceptions the amphibious portion of WHITEBAIT was most successful. 1-2/

The air defense and anti-submarine warfare portions of the exercises were less effective due to various communication problems and material incompatibility, however, from the overall standpoint the training was most valuable for all participants. 2

SECTION C - UNITED STATES UNMALATERAL OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS (SECRET)

Fifteen different submarines were assigned to operate with the fleet during 1959, including the nuclear powered submarine SKIPJACK. The submarines participated in formally scheduled exercises such as BAREZ and MEDASWEX; opposed fleet port entries and sorties; rendered services for basic ASW training; were provided with targets to conduct pro-submarine training; and, conducted several routine photographic reconnaissance missions.

The SKIPJACK, first nuclear ship to operate in the Mediterranean, completed an opposed but undetected transit of the Strait of Gibraltar on 21 August 1959. A speed of twenty knots at a depth of 500 feet was used to conduct the transit. The composition of the opposition included air, surface and submarine units. SKIPJACK operated in the Mediterranean for 10 days. During this period seven minor exercises were conducted. In addition, port calls were made at La Spezia, Italy and Gibraltar where approved visitors were received and given opportunity to familiarize themselves with this new type submarine.

STRIKEX (SECRET)

A STRIKEX is a full rehearsal by SIXTH Fleet of the National or NATO Atomic Strike plans. Equivalent targets in a friendly nation are used in lieu of actual targets. Surface Atomic Weapons replenishment is conducted. Intergal aircraft are used to exercise the fleet

L/ CTF 61 Confidential MSG 251806Z JUN 1959

2/ CTF 62 Confidential MSG 252038Z 3 JUN 1959 3/ CINCNELM ADMIN Confidential MSG 281836Z JUN 1959

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air defense capability. The most significant STRIKEI was BIG DEAL.

1/ This SECOND/SIXTH STRIKE Fleet Exercise conducted 25 April
1 May in the Western Mediterranean provided highly profitable
training in sustained strike, air defense, ASW and ECM operations.
Gradual improvement in all aspects was noted throughout the exercise.
A coordinated four day STRIKE STRIKE GYL was conducted effectively
against equivalent targets in Spain and Italy. 83 percent of the
targets were successfully struck. Strike clearance, weather and
ADD grounding caused some slippage in strikes.

Sustained Air Defense Exercises during the conduct of strike and in a limited ECM environmentprovided maximum Air Defense training and permitted full test of fleet procedures and capabilities. The training conducted was realistic and profitable. The greatest benefit was the demonstrated ability of the participating ships and staffs to continue active air defense for over 30 consecutive hours.

MIDLINK II (UNCLASSIFIED)

During the period 16 November - 4 December 1959, nations of the CEMTO PACT conducted their annual Combined Martine Training Exercise MIDLINK II. One SIXTH Fleet submarine, and two COMMIDEASTFOR destroyers particinated. The reports received indicate that the exercise provided valuable experience for all participating units with excellent coordination and cooperation manifested amoung all participants.

MINE WARFARE OPERATIONS (CONFIDENTIAL)

The deployed minesweeping division participated in all scheduled SIXIM Fleet amphibious exercises and swept shead of the amphibious forces. The present division of minesweepers deployed to the Mediterranean consists of 4 MSO's (Minesweeper Ocean - non-magnetic). The MSO has excellent seaworthiness, moderate sea keeping ability and is the U.S. Navy's most effective minesweeper for all purposes except sweeping in very shallow or confined water. All wooden or non-magnetic material was used in the construction of these ships and they can sweep effectively the moored, magnetic, and acoustic mines and combinations thereof.

These mineswepers are equiped with the AN/UGS-1 mine hunting sonar which provides a limited mine hunting capability. Minehunting as an alternative counter to any type of mine, is the practice of

Commander Second Fleet 1tr of Instruction ser 044 dated 26 January 1959

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locating mines by sonic or electronic means. It is effective against moored mines, but still relatively ineffective for bottom mines, which present the greater threat. Improved minehunting sonar and mine classification equipment is under development.

In addition to the MSO's five sets of emergency small boat minesweeping gear is stored aboard the AKA attached to CTF 61. This gear is mounted on LCVP type assault boats and is also used in scheduled SIXTH Fleet amphibious exercises. It is effective for moored mines only.

Since 11 August 1959 the Belgian MSO TRUFFAUT has been operating as an integral part of the SIXTH Fleet mine division. Operations have proved that the TRUFFAUT is a well trained minesweeper cpable of performing all tasks required of an MSO. The TRUFFAUT will remain with the SIXTH Fleet mine division until 24 January 1960 when she will return to Belgium.

SUBMARINE SURVIELLANCE (SECRET)

During the period 12-18 December 1959 patrol aircraft of the U.S., UK and France participated in tracking & Soviet submarines and one T-43 minesweeper from the Baltic fleet during their transit of the Mediterranean to their base at Vlone, Albania. The successful and coordinated tracking once again proved that this trilateral operation enables the participants to maintain surveillance of transiting Soviet units without undue strain on the peace-time force and budget of any one nation.

BEHLIN (SECRET)

Because of the anticipated Berlin crisis in May 1959, the SIXTH Fleet was brought to an advanced state of readiness and deployed in alert posture. Specific measures taken included:

During the period 4 May to 2 June one Carrier Task Unit was maintained at sea at all times; for most of the period both Carrier Task Units were at sea. Each carrier maintained at least six aircraft in immediate launch status. The area of operations was shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean - Ionian Sea and eastward as far as 300 East.

The airfield at Suda Bay was activiated from 4 May to 2 June. Continuous ASW and shipping surveillance patrols were flown from this airstrip.

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One submarine was on patrol in the Ionian Sea during the period 1-30 May, with the mission to observe and report ship movements, particularly submarines, in the Vlone area.

One submarine was on patrol 1-11 May and 16-28 May off Alexandria to observe UAR and Suez Canal Shipping.

A destroyer patrol was maintained off Vlone and another off Alezandria during most of the month of May.

An additional AO was deployed to the SIXTH Fleet to supply additional demands for ship and aircraft fuels.

MONSOON (UNCLASSIFIED)

The Naval Component of US CINCEUR played an appropriate role in Operation MONSOON. U.S.S. TACONIC (AGC-17) transited the Suez Canal on 23 November and remained in Karachi from 2 to 14 December to provide communication facilities and other services for the Presidential party. In addition, U.S.S. HERMITAGE (LSD-34) CHOPPED from LENTELT to SIXTHFLT on 18 November, exchanged some helicopters with U.S.S. SHADWELL (LSD-15) and visited Karachi from 2 to 15 December to provide helicopter services for the Presidential party. SHADWELL carried her helicopters to Istanbul where they flew to Ankara to provide helicopter services for the Presidential party during the Ankara visit. The President and immediate party travelled in U.S.S. DES MOINES (CA-134) from Athens on 15 December to Tunis on 17 December and disembarked in Toulon on 18 December. The SIXTH Fleet escorted the Presidential Flagship and provided an impressive Fleet Review and aerial demonstration by carrier aircraft. Press representatives had a fine trip and excellent communications in U.S.S. ESSEX which was one of the escorting ships. In addition four destroyers were on SAR picket stations in the eastern Atlantic during the Presidential flight from Casablanca homeword bound on 22 December.

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

During the period of this report, the SIXTH Fleet conducted amphibious exercises on a frequency of about one per month, either as an independent exercise or as part of an overall Fleet exercise.

During 1959, in addition to the joint or combined amphiblous exercises previously mentioned, national exercises were conducted one or more times at Zuara, Libya; Porto Scudo, Sardinia; Stavromenos, Crete; Anzio, Italy; and Dikili, Turkey. In each instance, the exercises involved the amphiblious squadron and Marine battalion landing team which

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